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RELATIONAL RIGHTS MASQUERADING AS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
HALLIE LUDSIN* 
ABSTRACT 
This article seeks to fill a void in rights theory that permitted Western 
policy-makers to support the Iraqi and Afghan constitutions despite the risk 
they posed to women’s rights.  Women’s advocacy efforts focused on the danger 
of discrimination from constitutional protection of religious law, which policy-
makers stated would be countered by the constitutions’ progressive human 
rights provisions.  The concept of discrimination failed to capture the true depth 
of harm, which is that religious law may exclude women from the protection of 
some or all of those human rights provisions.  This article proposes expanding 
the theory of relational rights to simply and clearly explain the process that 
could render constitutionally protected individual rights meaningless to women 
in these countries.  While the impetus for this article was the drafting of the Iraq 
and Afghan constitutions, this concept applies beyond these examples to any 
situation in which a country cedes authority over law or law enforcement to 
unaccountable non-governmental actors and is not limited to the adoption of 
religious law. 
Many women’s groups around the world watched the drafting and 
adoption of the constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq with horror, futilely trying 
to explain to policy-makers the danger constitutional protection for religious 
law poses to women’s rights.  The focus of their advocacy efforts was on the 
obvious discrimination that results from conservative and at this time prevailing 
interpretations of Shari’a law. Western policy-makers all too easily countered 
these efforts by pointing to the progressive human rights protections in both 
constitutions, claiming that they will balance out any detrimental effect of 
religion in government.1 
 
 * Hallie Ludsin is a Fellow in Human Rights and Terrorism at the Institute for Global Security 
Law and Policy at Case Western Reserve University School of Law and a legal consultant to the 
Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Ramallah, West Bank.  Thank you to Marius 
Pieterse, Amos Guiora, William Carter and Ravi Nessman for their insightful comments on this 
article. 
 1. See, e.g., President Discusses Iraqi Constitution with Press Pool (August 23, 2005) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050823.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2007); 
Constitutionalism in the Muslim World: A Conversation With Noah Feldman http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
journals/itdhr/0304/ijde/feldman.htm (last visited February 13, 2007); I use the phrase “Western 
policy-makers” rather than “American policy-makers” because officials from other Western 
countries and inter-governmental bodies supported the constitution despite women’s concerns in 
agreement with their American counterparts.  See, e.g., Iraq FAQs: Does the Iraqi constitution erode 
women’s rights? Foreign and Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front? 
pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1082830025454 (Deflects concerns over 
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What was missing from women’s advocacy efforts was a coherent 
conceptual framework to describe the true depth of the injury to women, which 
far exceeds the threat of discrimination.  A new concept is needed to explain 
how constitutional protection for religious or cultural law can remove the 
safeguards of many, if not most, of the human rights provisions by making them 
unenforceable by women.2  To fill this void, I propose an expanded theory of 
relational rights to simply and clearly express not only the extent of the damage 
constitutional protection of religious or cultural law can cause to women, but 
also the process that transforms individual rights into relational rights.  By 
arming women’s groups with a new concept, this article seeks to prevent 
Western policy-makers from supporting constitutional protection of religious or 
cultural law without examining women’s concerns more deeply. 
Part I of this article explains the theory of relational rights and its disparate 
impact on women. One important point described in this section is that the risk 
of harm expressed by the concept of relational rights is not limited to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, to the adoption of religious or cultural law or to women.  Part II 
applies the expanded theory to the Iraqi and Afghan constitutions to illustrate 
more fully how constitutional entrenchment of religious or cultural law creates 
the possibility that women will be removed from under the protection of 
constitutional human rights provisions.  It is intended to counter the assumption 
of Western policy-makers that progressive human rights provisions can 
neutralize the harm to women.  While it is too late for this concept to influence 
the drafting processes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the understanding of how 
relational rights work may stop their development in other constitutions. 
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the effect of religious personal status law on Iraqi women by noting the democratic process that will 
lead to the constitution’s adoption). 
 2. I purposely use the conditional verb tense in this introduction because progressive 
interpretations of Shari’a law, such as have occurred in several Muslim countries, could mitigate the 
dangers inherent in these constitutions.  Hoping for such interpretations rather than mandating the 
protection of all rights for all individuals, however, should not be enough of a basis to justify 
supporting these constitutions. 
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I. RELATIONAL RIGHTS 
Part I introduces the expanded theory of relational rights to provide a 
framework for understanding the risk of harm women face from the 
constitutional protection of religious law in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although 
ultimately the focus of this article is on the constitutional entrenchment of 
religious law, Section A develops the theory more generally, describing how it 
applies in several different contexts.  Section B discusses the disparate impact of 
relational rights on women, which is important to understanding why relational 
rights are a women’s issue.  Section C then examines how group rights, such as 
the right to be governed by religious or cultural law, elevate the risk that 
individual rights will become relational.  Part I ends in Section D with a brief 
discussion of one possible method for preventing the constitutional 
transformation of individual rights into relational rights. 
A. The Theory 
Relational rights are rights that are derived from the government, such as 
from a constitution, legislation or a judicial decision, but that individuals can 
exercise only with the permission or acquiescence of someone with whom they 
have a personal relationship.3  Suad Joseph developed the initial concept based 
on her research and experiences in Lebanon where political circumstances were 
such that average citizens rarely were able to claim their rights and entitlements 
from the government without the help of their personal relationships.4  Access to 
public services and resources depended on a patronage system that forced 
individuals to develop vast social networks.5  Joseph provided the example of a 
neighbor who had been unable to obtain certification of his residency in 
Lebanon from the government.  Her neighbor approached her for help.  Joseph 
turned to her friends, who turned to their networks and so on until the neighbor 
eventually received his papers.6  What should have been a simple and regular 
task of the government could not be completed without resort to private sources 
of power.  Joseph extrapolated from a wide number of such examples that in 
Lebanon citizen’s rights, or rights that inhere in individuals as a result of their 
citizenship in a country, had been transformed into relational rights in which 
access to them depended on personal networks of power. 
Joseph’s concept of relational rights can be developed to apply beyond the 
political transformation of rights through a patronage system to a 
transformation through law, law enforcement or their failures.  In this expanded 
conception, government action, or in some cases inaction, removes certain areas 
 
 3. Suad Joseph describes relational rights and responsibilities as occurring when “a person’s sense of 
entitlements and duties came from specific relationships that they built or were built for them.” Suad Joseph, 
Teaching Rights and Responsibilities: Paradoxes of Globalization and Children’s Citizenship in 
Lebanon, 38(4) J. SOC. HIST. 1007, 1010 (2005).  Cheryl Rubenberg considers them “the outcome of 
distinctive relationships that people actively construct and work to sustain.” Cheryl A Rubenberg, 
PALESTINIAN WOMEN: PATRIARCHY AND RESISTANCE IN THE WEST BANK 121 (2001). 
 4. Suad Joseph, Problematizing Gender and Relational Rights: Experiences from Lebanon 1(3) SOC. 
POL., 272, 272-73 (1994). 
 5. Id. at 277—78. 
 6. Id. at 279. 
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of law or law enforcement from government oversight so that there is no 
accountability mechanism with the ability and/or willingness to enforce human 
rights.  Governments create this void either by permitting unaccountable 
persons or bodies to determine the rules within particular areas of law or by 
ceding law enforcement to such actors.  By surrendering its jurisdiction, the 
government allows these private actors to determine for others the content of 
human rights, and therefore access to them, without any meaningful oversight. 
The concept developed here differs from Joseph’s in that she seems to 
envision an individual needing a relative or an acquaintance to act essentially as 
a broker between the government and the individual.  The government retains 
the power to provide the rights while the broker serves as a bridge between the 
individual and the government necessary to access those rights.  Anyone with 
access to an effective broker then can achieve their rights.  In my conception, 
personal relations are more directly responsible for determining the contours 
and boundaries of a person’s rights as they actually control them.  To clarify the 
difference, in Joseph’s example, if she and her personal network were unable to 
help the neighbor access his rights, he could turn to others for help to reach the 
government.  Under my theory, there would be no one else who could help him 
as the government in effect would have relinquished its power to safeguard and 
enforce the neighbor’s rights to a specific person or group within his personal 
network, who then could decide whether and when to enforce or deny those 
rights.  To avoid confusion, where necessary to delineate between Joseph’s 
theory and mine, I will refer to my concept as the expanded theory of relational 
rights.  Despite these differences, many of the lessons Joseph draws from her 
concept of relational rights apply also to the expanded theory. 
The beneficiaries of this now private jurisdiction usually are the most 
powerful members of the community.  Where these rights exist, access to them 
depends on the strength of a person’s relationships with those more powerful 
actors and the bargaining chips they hold.7  The dominant by-product of 
relational rights is the creation of differentiated citizenship under which citizens 
receive the benefit and privileges of citizenship based on the strength of their 
social relationships.8  Some people will have full access to their rights, while 
others will have only some or even no access. 9  Citizens are not entitled to the 
same rights, and the strength of their rights could change as their relationships 
change.10 Relational rights reinforce any existing social hierarchies or power 
imbalances between individuals, particularly between men and women, a point 
that is examined more fully in Part I (B) below.11 
 
 7. See, e.g., Rubenberg, supra note 3, at 144—45 (Describing the process of  “reality bargaining” 
that women undertake to receive their rights from or solve their problems with their husbands ). 
 8. For a description of differentiated citizenship, see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL 
CITIZENSHIP 182 (1995). 
 9. Joseph, supra note 4, at 278 (“Rights were not stable givens.  They shifted with people and 
with situations.  Rights changed as relationships transformed – growing stronger, weaker, broader, 
narrower, more generalized, more specialized.  The fluid and shifting character of rights 
corresponded to the fluid and shifting character of relationships.”) 
 10. Id. 
 11. Rubenberg, supra note 3, at 151. 
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Relational rights can be created when law or practice gives non-
governmental actors the power to interpret or enforce law.  In some instances, 
the unwillingness or inability of a government to enforce law creates relational 
rights.  The lack of enforcement could result from a conscious decision of 
governmental actors or could be an element of a weak or failing state.  The lack 
of accountability must be systemic and not simply a bad ruling or decision by a 
government official. The accountability mechanisms in that country must 
acquiesce to the transfer of the power to determine the content of and/or to 
enforce rights to private actors. 
The treatment of domestic violence cases in much of the world 
demonstrates the conversion of individual rights to relational rights that results 
from the government’s unwillingness to enforce law – or the systemic 
relinquishment of enforcement power to non-governmental actors.  Throughout 
the world, police often are reluctant to intervene in domestic violence cases, 
believing that what goes on between intimate partners and within families is 
private.  For example, in the United States standard protocol for a long time 
encouraged police officers to establish momentary peace rather than arrest and 
prosecute abusers or provide for a different long-term solution.12 Such failure to 
address domestic violence violates women’s right to equal protection of law by 
treating violence against women differently than violence among any other 
persons and also violates women’s right to bodily integrity. The harm, however, 
goes far deeper than the violation of these rights. When police refuse to 
intervene in “private” family matters, they relinquish control over the 
enforcement of the right to bodily integrity to the husbands.  The husbands then 
decide whether women can access this right by deciding whether to abuse their 
wives.  Through the government’s acquiescence to this transfer of power, 
women’s individual right to bodily integrity becomes relational. 
In other instances, a constitution or legislation expressly assigns such 
control so that compliance with the rule of law establishes relational rights.  
South Africa’s customary law of succession illustrates how this process can 
work. This example is imperfect in that the South African constitution also 
supplies the solution to relational rights; however it illustrates the potential for 
constitutions and legislation to create relational rights. 
Customary law is defined by the South African legislature as “the customs 
and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of 
South Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples.”13  As a system 
of dispute resolution, it stresses conciliation and mediation to maintain harmony 
within the community rather than focusing on fault.14  At the center of the fluid 
rules are the family and community: “[u]nlike most Western legal systems, 
 
 12. David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to 
Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1165—1166 (1995).  I have chosen to use the 
example from the United States to illustrate that relational rights are not just a phenomenon of the 
developing world. 
 13. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 s. 1(ii). 
 14. Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa’s Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the Future of 
its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J INT’L L 62, 70 (2003). 
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customary law focuses on the obligation of an individual to the family and 
collective, rather than on individual personal rights.”15 
Article 15(3) of South Africa’s constitution allows the enactment of 
legislation recognizing traditional systems of personal status or family law.16  
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 (“Customary Marriages 
Act”) was adopted in accordance with Article 15(3) to recognize as legal 
marriages conducted under African customary law.17  The Customary Marriages 
Act permits cultural norms to control personal status matters of black South 
Africans and, by doing so, allows privileged individuals to determine access to 
rights for their relations. 
Under Article 7(1) of the Customary Marriages Act, customary law governs 
the proprietary consequences of customary marriages completed before the 
statute went into effect.18  One proprietary consequence is that all property is 
deemed to belong to the husband, 19 with the limited exception of personal items 
such as clothing.20  In exchange for the husband’s “right” to control all marital 
property, customary law places on men a duty to use the property to care for 
their wives and families.21  Customary law further prohibits a woman from 
inheriting property.22  On the death of a husband, any property belonging to the 
husband, which includes all marital property, passes by intestate succession to 
the closest and most senior male from her husband’s family, which could be a 
son, the husband’s brother, his father, grandfather or even his uncle.23  It follows 
a system of primogeniture.  Customary law places a duty on the heir of the 
estate to take financial care of the widow, daughters and minor sons for as long 
as they live on the deceased’s property.24  The heir must meet his obligations 
regardless of the size and wealth of the estate he inherits.25  If the widow or 
children eligible for care leave the property, the heir is no longer required to 
support them and he keeps the husband’s estate.26 
The legal adoption of a system of customary law for persons married prior 
to the statute’s enforcement converts a variety of women’s rights into relational 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. ART. 15(3). 
 17. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
 18. Any customary marriage completed after the date of the enforcement of the Customary 
Marriage Act is governed by community of property, which means the date of the customary 
marriage determines property rights. Id. at s. 7(2). 
 19. NJJ OLIVIER ET AL., INDIGENOUS LAW 148-149 (1995); Ericka Curran & Elsje Bonthuys 
Customary Law and Domestic Violence in Rural South African Communities, Centre for the Study 
of Violence and Reconciliation (2004) 2.4.3. 
 20. Curran & Bonthuys, supra note 19, at 2.3.3. 
 21. TW BENNET, A  SOURCEBOOK OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 236 (1991) (the head of family’s 
“first obligation is to use house property to maintain the wife and children of the house concerned.”) 
 22. OLIVIER, BEKKER ET AL., supra note 19, at 160. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Project WIDOWHOOD, INHERITANCE LAWS, 
CUSTOMS & PRACTICES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1995) 52. 
 26. NJJ OLIVIER ET AL., supra note 20 at 161.(“During her stay in the kraal of her deceased 
husband or as allocated to he, she and her children are entitled to proper maintenance and use of the 
assets of the estate, although she has no ownership in respect of that property.”) 
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rights.  In violation of constitutionally protected equality rights,27 customary law 
prohibits these married women from owning property with little exception and 
prohibits them from inheriting based on the men’s perceived social roles as 
protectors and financial providers for the families.28  It limits women’s right to 
own private property, 29 essentially treating them as legal minors.  Further, if 
widowed women want to benefit from the property to which they contributed, 
they cannot leave their husband’s property after his death, although the 
constitution protects the right to freedom of movement.30  The only way they can 
access their equality, property or freedom of movement rights is with the 
permission of their husband or their husband’s heir.  Rights women should be 
able to approach the government to enforce, the Customary Marriages Act 
permits to be determined solely by the woman’s husband or his heir.  
Fortunately, South Africa’s Constitutional Court undid the customary law of 
succession’s transformation of individual rights into relational rights using the 
constitution as its basis; the decision is discussed in Part I (D) below. 
Relational rights reflect a problem in the process of accessing and enforcing 
rights.  The content of the rights is irrelevant to determining whether rights are 
relational.  What matters is (1) who is responsible for deciding whether a right 
can be exercised, and (2) whether the person or body is accountable for his or 
her decisions.  Even if the content meets personal or international standards of 
rights, societies do not want unaccountable sources of power controlling aspects 
of their lives.  The content becomes important, however, when determining who 
is impacted by the transfer of jurisdiction. 
Critics of the theory of relational rights might argue that all rights are 
relational in all countries because access to justice for at least some segment of 
society always requires the cooperation and support of others.  For example, 
everyone needs financial resources to litigate claims for violations of their rights, 
with the exception of some criminal defendants who are entitled to free legal 
representation.  Other than in those limited circumstances, the indigent are 
likely to find that they cannot exercise their rights without the financial support 
of their personal networks, which could include private legal aid organizations.  
In another example, women living in patriarchal societies not only are unlikely 
to have the independent financial resources to fight for their rights, but where 
rights violations are committed by family members, they may lack the emotional 
support to sustain what could be a protracted and emotionally-charged battle.  
What differentiates this article’s conception of relational rights from these 
examples of barriers to access to justice is whether formal mechanisms of 
accountability retain the jurisdiction to enforce an individual’s rights.  In the 
examples of the indigent and of women in patriarchal societies, there is an 
assumption that the courts have the jurisdiction and are willing to adjudicate 
 
 27. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. ART. 9. . 
 28. Curran & Bonthuys, supra note 19 at 2.2 (describing that at the time the rules were developed 
and in the context of subsistence economies, the purpose of the  rules was to ensure women’s 
security by guaranteeing that someone would be responsible for their maintenance.”. Boys and men 
who are not the first born male child also cannot inherit in a system of primogeniture, which 
discriminates against them on the basis of birth order rather than their sex.) 
 29. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. ART. 25. 
 30. Id. at  ART. 21 
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claims of rights violations for litigants with the financial and emotional 
wherewithal to file a claim.  The expanded theory of relational rights, on the 
other hand, is premised expressly on the lack of government oversight of rights 
violations, which means there is no possibility of legal recourse for such 
violations regardless of an individual’s resources. 
B. Women and Relational Rights 
Both men and women can be affected by relational rights, yet their creation 
typically has a disparate impact on women.  While the key to the transformation 
of individual rights to relational rights is the shifting of the interpretation 
and/or enforcement of areas of law to private actors, the cause of the harm is the 
treatment of this jurisdiction as private or outside governmental oversight.  
Essentially, the handing over of governmental functions to non-governmental 
actors, whether by will, force or acquiescence, institutes a public-private divide, 
a concept with which feminist thinkers are only too familiar. 
The public-private divide is established according to the belief that there 
are certain aspects of people’s lives that should be protected from government 
interference, although if a state is failing, it may be created without choice.  
Typically, the family and home are considered private and therefore protected 
from outside scrutiny or intervention except to maintain the status quo; the 
public realm, which consists of government and the economy, are treated as 
deserving of the full protection of the government.31  Where this public-private 
divide exists, men are its beneficiaries particularly since retaining the status quo 
usually means maintaining any existing power imbalances between family 
members.32  In societies that conform to a traditional model of the family, the 
husband is treated as head of the household and his decisions as inviolable, 
including – if necessary – the decision to chastise physically and emotionally his 
wife and children.33  Male authority and violence within the family and women’s 
concomitant subordination are protected from government intervention, not the 
 
 31. Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 568–69 (2006); Susan 
Moller Okin, Equal Citizenship: Gender ‘Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1537, 1551-1552 (2004); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 955 
(1991) reprinted in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES 388 (D. Kelly 
Weisberg ed. 1996). 
 32. Kim, supra note 31, at 571. (“Domestic violence has been viewed as a literal example of 
power’s influence in family life.  Feminists have pointed to the ways in which privacy has reinforced 
the power of powerful members of families—i.e., husbands and fathers—over less powerful women 
and children, by ratifying “openly hierarchical” social roles within the family in the guise of 
nonintervention and freedom.”) The concept of privacy in family matters is not always bad.  For 
example, individuals should be provided the opportunity to make decisions regarding their health, 
family planning or how they wish to raise their children with little interference from their 
government. Id. at 995. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991), 
reprinted in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES 388 (D. Kelly Weisberg 
ed.1996)  See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 725 (1999). Such 
protection would allow individuals to exercise their autonomy without infringing on the rights of 
others.  Id. The problem with the public-private divide created by relational rights is that it has the 
opposite effect – it permits men to subordinate women to their interests, denying them their rights. 
 33. Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory, 11 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 303, 303 (2005). 
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family.34  Women (and children) suffer heavily as a result.  In the public sphere, 
men receive the benefits of government protection from abuses of their rights;35 
whereas “sex-based exclusionary laws join with other institutional and 
ideological constraints to directly limit women’s participation” in that sphere, 
which means they profit less from public rights.36 
As the two examples from the previous section show, the areas of law 
subject to interpretation and/or enforcement by private actors often follow 
existing notions of the public-private divide and protect patriarchal control.  In 
the South African example, the only area of law the constitution expressly 
permits to be governed by religious or cultural law is family law.37  With 
domestic violence, courts around the world for a long time condoned some 
forms of physical abuse as the husband’s prerogative as head of the household 
and because of the concept that the home is the man’s castle.38  In both instances, 
jurisdiction over aspects of family relations is ceded to private sources of power, 
consistent with the divide. 
Where men and women both suffer from relational rights, men are likely to 
have greater access to power and therefore to their relational rights. As Joseph 
described of Lebanon: “[s]tate officials often preferred dealing with and were 
more likely to be responsive to males and seniors.  State officials often set up 
idiomatic patriarchal relations with those seeking their services – relations that 
further enhanced the position of males and seniors.”39  As a consequence of the 
interaction of the patronage system and patriarchy, women found that access to 
their rights depended on their conformity with social mores. 40  Women 
confronted additional hurdles that did not exist to the same degree or at all for 
men.41  While Joseph’s description applies to the situation where members of 
personal networks were necessary to act as brokers to reach the government, the 
hurdles are the same for women under an expanded theory of relational rights.  
As described in Part I (A), the jurisdiction transfer typically benefits the more 
powerful members of society, usually men.  As a direct result of patriarchy, 
which arguably exists everywhere, men prefer to deal with men and are likely to 
hold them in higher esteem.  This greater respect for men translates into greater 
access to their rights.42 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Kim, supra note 31, at 568–69. 
 36. Schneider, supra note 31, at 388. 
 37. The provision ensures that a court will not deem religious or cultural family law an inherent 
violation of the constitution’s freedom of religion clause.  It is notable for the fact that it is the only 
area of religious or cultural law given specific constitutional protection. 
 38. Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN, 195, 209–10 (1995). 
 39. Joseph, supra note 4, at 283. 
 40. Id. at 282–83. 
 41. Joseph describes that women often needed the intervention of men as negotiators to achieve 
their relational rights.  Id. at 283. 
 42. See, e.g. Id.  Relational rights also can privilege the economic and social elite, regardless of 
their sex, as their enhanced access to private power may give them greater access to their rights.  In 
doing so, relational rights can exacerbate the inequalities of minority groups and the poor. 
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In other cases, men’s rights remain individual rights while women’s are 
relational, again because of patriarchy.  As described in Part I (A), under South 
African customary laws of marriage and succession and until recently, men 
retained full access to their property and equality rights while they were given 
the power to determine women’s access to those rights.  The result is the same in 
the example of domestic violence.  While women have only a relational right to 
bodily integrity, men faced with violence in the public sphere have an 
individual right the government, through the police, will enforce.43  As this 
section shows, rarely is the privatization of law enforcement and rights 
interpretation in the interest of women. 
C. The Special Case of Group Rights 
The concept of group rights has substantial potential for transforming 
individual rights into relational rights.  Group rights are special protections and 
entitlements groups receive on the basis of the particular characteristics that 
define their membership.  Group rights can be defined as rights derived from a 
person’s membership in a group rather than his or her status as an individual; 
these rights can belong to the group or to the individual as part of his or her 
membership in the group.44 
Numerous countries are struggling with the question of whether to provide 
groups with the right to organize aspects of their lives according to their 
religious or cultural beliefs and practices.  In societies where the group is in the 
majority, adoption of religious or cultural laws and practices can be considered 
part of the democratic decision to allow society to determine how it wishes to be 
governed. In many countries, group rights reflect the communitarian nature of 
their societies in which individual rights have never been dominant in the 
political or legal culture. Where the religious or cultural group is in the minority, 
typically these groups are advocating for the adoption of some or all of their 
religious or cultural family law and/or the right to religious or cultural 
education.45 For minority groups, group rights can provide the opportunity to 
express culture or religion.  They can provide equal access to religion or culture 
and send the message that their culture or religion is a valued part of their 
society.46  For both minority and majority groups, group rights can increase their 
enjoyment of individual rights that can be accessed best as part of a group.47 
While there are a variety of criticisms of group rights,48 the concern for 
purposes of this paper is the extent to which protection of group rights 
 
 43. Other examples of men retaining their individual rights while women’s rights become 
relational are described in Part II (B) below. 
 44. KYMLICKA, supra note 8, at 45. 
 45. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of 
Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 387 (2000)(discussing benefits of group rights 
for minority groups). 
 46. See, e.g., Id. at 391—92. 
 47. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN 31 (Joshua Cohen et. al eds., 
1999) (Quoting Will Kymlicka). 
 48. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 8; OKIN, supra note 47, at 47 (quoting Yael Tamir); SHACHAR, 
supra note 46. 
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establishes relational rights through the adoption of religious or cultural law 
into the legal system or as a separate legal system.  Religious and cultural 
practices are problematic when they are based on a division of social roles that 
creates unequal power relations between members of the group.49 When 
religious or cultural law codifies these unequal relations, giving some members 
of the group control over the actions of others, they create relational rights.  
South Africa’s customary law as described in Part I (A) provides a clear example 
of this.  Again, women are disproportionately at risk of subordination to the 
interests of men and the group.50  As Ayelet Shachar explains, “religious 
traditions often encode within their legal traditions various formal and informal 
mechanisms for controlling the personal status and sexuality of women, 
primarily because women play a central and potentially powerful role in 
symbolically reproducing the collective.”51  This explanation applies equally to 
cultural traditions. 
Although group rights risk transforming many individual rights into 
relational rights, they should not be conflated.  Not all group rights create 
relational rights, even when they result in inequality.  If a law based on cultural 
practice prohibits women from testifying in court, the end result is 
discrimination not relational rights. The law does not provide anyone with the 
discretion to refuse women the right to testify, but instead is applied to all 
women.  At least in theory, simply because a country adopts religious or 
cultural law as the basis of their legal system by itself does not mean that 
individual rights will be turned into relational rights. Again, relational rights in 
this context arise when unequal power relations between individuals are 
adopted into the legal system. 
Group rights need to be tailored carefully to ensure that their positive goals 
are not overshadowed by their negative impact – that these rights are protected 
to allow individuals to express themselves as part of a group and not permitted 
to create relational rights.52  South Africa offers an example of how to protect 
group rights without transforming individual rights into relational rights.  
When the customary law of succession was challenged as a violation of 
women’s equality, South Africa’s Constitutional Court relied on provisions in 
the constitution that require customary law to be consistent with the constitution 
to establish accountability and undo the relational rights.53  It found that 
primogeniture violated the constitution by “impl[ying] that women are not fit or 
competent to own and administer property. Its effect is also to subject these 
women to a status of perpetual minority, placing them automatically under the 
control of male heirs, simply by virtue of their sex and gender.”54 
Many proponents of religious and cultural law argue that placing these 
laws in a subordinate position to constitutional human rights would lead to 
 
 49. Shachar, supra note 45, at 397–98. 
 50. Id. at 396. 
 51. Id. at 397. 
 52. KYMLICKA, supra note 8, at 34. 
 53. Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha & Others, 1 BLCR 1, ¶¶41-44 read together with ¶100 (CC 2005). 
 54. Id. at 92. 
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their eradication.55  This discussion implicates the debate surrounding the 
concepts of universal human rights and cultural relativism.  If accountable 
bodies adopt notions of universal human rights then religious or cultural beliefs 
and practices that follow different interpretations of those rights will be treated 
as unconstitutional.  If that happens, group rights will be stripped of any 
meaning.56  These concerns are not related to the question of relational rights, 
which is a process issue, but instead are focused on the content of rights.  For 
this reason, the paper need not delve further into the debate.  The important 
point for our purposes is that group rights create relational rights when they 
permit private actors to determine the content of rights for persons within their 
personal networks without accountability.  When that happens, the benefits 
achieved by group rights are outweighed by the harm to individuals and must 
be treated as wholly unacceptable. 
D. The Solution 
The end result of transforming individual rights into relational rights in 
many cases is the exclusion of individuals, particularly women, from human 
rights safeguards, including those expressly protected by a constitution.  The 
most obvious way to reverse the transformation is to eradicate the public-
private divide by returning all aspects of governance to the government or 
placing all areas of law under governmental oversight.  How that can be 
accomplished depends on what is causing jurisdiction over law and/or law 
enforcement to be removed from the government. 
Where relational rights are created through law or a constitution, the law or 
constitution needs to be changed to permit the enforcement of human rights 
against private actors, ensuring their accountability.  Traditionally, constitutions 
permit individuals to challenge violations of their rights by the government, but 
not so-called “private” violations of rights.57  For example, a family-owned 
business in the United States that discriminates against women in hiring violates 
the law but not the constitution.  The power to legislate against such 
discrimination may derive from the constitution, but these employers currently 
can be sued only under federal or local statutes because their behavior is not 
considered state action.  The application of constitutional human rights 
provisions to private actors would change this situation.  Individuals would no 
longer need to rely on the legislature to protect their human rights from 
“private” violations through legislation, such as in the employment example, 
but instead would be able to turn directly to the constitution to enforce their 
rights.  The accountability of private actors for constitutional human rights 
 
 55. See, e.g., Titia Loenen , The Equality Clause in the South African Constitution: Some 
Remarks From a Comparative Perspective 113 SAJHR 401 (1997) (“Because African culture is 
pervaded by the principle of patriarchy, the gender equality clause now threatens a thorough-going 
purge of customary law”); AJ Kerr ‘Inheritance in Customary Law Under the Interim Constitution 
and Under the Present Constitution’ 1998 115 SALJ 263, 266–67 (1998). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 57.Catherine Phuong, Persecution by Third Parties and European Harmonization of Asylum 
Policies, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 81, 87 (2001). 
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violations would fill any gap in government jurisdiction over areas of law and 
over law enforcement, ensuring the option of formal accountability. 
An example of a constitutional provision guaranteeing the application of 
human rights to private actors can be found in South Africa’s constitution.  
Article 8(2) reads: “A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic 
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”58  In this formulation, 
not all rights are enforceable against individuals, but only those that seem 
appropriate.  For example, if a constitution protects the socio-economic right to 
housing, it is unlikely that a court would find that individuals owe that duty to 
others.  However, when jurisdiction over the determination of the content of 
rights is surrendered to non-governmental actors, then the application of human 
rights provisions to those actors would seem appropriate.59 A different solution 
to correct the problem of relational rights is necessary when they are created 
because the government is unable or unwilling to enforce individual rights.  
How to solve these accountability failures is beyond the scope of this article 
since the focus is on constitutionally-created relational rights. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTRENCHED  
RELATIONAL RIGHTS: THE CASES OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
Part II undertakes a more in depth examination of how constitutions can 
create relational rights to concretize what so far has been described mostly as 
theory.  The reason for focusing on this method of transformation of individual 
rights into relational rights is that it provides women’s advocates with a 
framework for describing the harm that can be caused by the constitutional 
protection of religious or cultural law, a phenomenon that has happened and 
continues to happen throughout the Middle East,60 Africa61 and Asia.62  Using the 
 
 58. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ART. 8(2). 
 59. As Osiatynski explains, critics of the application of human rights to private actors claim  it 
will cause undue strain on interpersonal relationships.  Wiktor Osiatynski, Human Rights for the 21st 
Century, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 29, 41 (2000).  The critique misses the point; 
this concept is intended, among other things, to challenge the status quo in personal relationships by 
tackling the problem of unequal power within them. 
 60. A variety of Middle Eastern constitutions protect a role for religious law in their 
constitutions.  Article 9 of the Lebanese constitution guarantees respect for the personal status laws 
of each religious sect within the country.  LEB CONST. 1990. ART. 9.  Egypt guarantees that “Islamic 
jurisprudence is the principal (sic) source of legislation.”  EGYPT CONST. 1980. ART. 2. (translated at 
http://www.uam.es/otroscentros/medina/egypt/egypolcon.htm)  Yemen’s constitution contains a 
similar provision.  YEMEN CONST. 1991. ART. 3 (Islamic Shari’ah is the source of all legislation.). 
 61. Some African constitutions protect customary law institutions that were under threat 
during colonialism, but often with an express limitation that the laws conform to human rights, such 
as in South Africa and Namibia.  South Africa allows family law to be governed by religious or 
cultural law if it does not conflict with the constitution or statutory law. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. ART. 
15(3).  Namibia allows customary law to govern where it has not been repealed by the legislature 
and it does not conflict with the constitution. NABIM.CONST. 1990. ART. 66. 
 62. The Constitution of Afghanistan adopts religious personal status law, at least in part, which 
is discussed in Part II(1).  The Malaysian constitution protects religious law to the extent that the 
legislature may make changes to it only if it consults with the government (MALAY. CONST. 1964. 
ART. 76) and protects personal status laws from invalidation by the constitution’s equality clause 
(MALAY. CONST. 1964. ART. 8(5)(A)).  The Constitution appears to expect personal status law to be 
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examples from the Afghan and Iraqi constitutions, Part II is intended to reveal 
the hidden nature of relational rights to prevent their adoption in future 
constitutions.  Part A describes the premises on which this discussion relies, 
while Part B examines how the transformation to relational rights is likely to 
occur in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
A. The Premises 
Iraq and Afghanistan’s constitutions protect a role for religion in 
government while at the same time guaranteeing a variety of progressive 
individual rights, including the right to equality. A superficial reading of the 
constitutions allowed Western policy-makers to assert that the human rights 
provisions insulate women from discrimination and oppression that could result 
from this role for religion.63  Such a superficial reading obscures the truth, which 
is that many individual rights become relational rights when the provisions are 
infused with social, political and legal context.  Once rights become relational, 
individuals no longer benefit from the full protection of the constitution, which 
challenges the assertions of these policy-makers. 
The first premise of this analysis is that both constitutions ensure the 
adoption of religious personal status law in their respective countries.  Personal 
status law governs the areas of marriage, divorce, custody, maintenance and 
inheritance.  The Afghan constitution contains three provisions that read 
separately and together require the adoption of religious personal status law, at 
least for a portion of the population but likely for all.  Article 131 states that the 
personal status matters of Shi’a followers, approximately 20% of the 
population,64 will be governed by Shi’a jurisprudence.65  The purpose of the 
provision is to protect their minority group rights.  At a minimum, the Afghan 
constitution deprives the legislature of the discretion to determine what law 
should govern Shi’a personal status matters and limits its ability to adopt a 
unified code. 
The constitution does not state explicitly that religious law governs the 
personal status matters of Sunni Muslims, approximately 80% of the 
population,66 but it can be inferred from Article 131, which seems to expect that 
Sunni jurisprudence will be adopted as general legislation.67  Even if Article 131 
does not result in the constitutional protection of Sunni personal status law, 
other provisions can be interpreted to provide that protection.  Article 3 states 
that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion 
 
governed at least in part by religious law.  MALAY. CONST. 1964. Ninth Schedule, List 1(1)(e)(1)  East 
Timor’s constitution permits customary law to govern, but it follows the lead of the African 
constitutions by requiring customary law to conform to the constitution and legislation.  E. TIMOR 
CONST. 2002. S. 2(4). 
 63. See, supra note 1.  
 64. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html#People.(Last visited 
Jan. 31, 2008). 
 65. AFG. CONST. 2004. ART. 131. 
 66. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 64. 
 67. See, e.g., AMIN TARZI, ASSESSING THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION (PART 1): PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION 2 AFGHANISTAN REPORT Volume 39 (2003). 
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of Islam.”68 The provision creates a repugnancy clause that requires all 
legislation to be measured against the moral and religious standards established 
by Islam; those that do not measure up will be deemed a violation of the 
constitution.69 Article 3 removes at least some legislative freedom in all areas, 
including personal status law.  Islam again is used as a measuring stick for 
governmental and individual behavior, this time specifically related to the 
family, in Article 54.  This provision guarantees that the state will protect the 
well-being of the family including by eliminating “traditions contrary to the 
principles of sacred religion of Islam.”70  It seems intended to target traditional 
practices that are part of Afghanistan’s customary law or informal legal system 
that serves as the de facto legal system for the majority of Afghanis,71 but it could 
be used against more “progressive” traditions as well.  Article 54 expresses the 
intention to subject family practices to religious scrutiny.72  While the legislature 
may retain the ability to enact personal status legislation, as a result of these 
repugnancy clauses, it appears their powers may be restricted mostly to process 
related legislation.  Articles 3 and 54 strongly suggest that the substance of 
personal status law must be determined by religion.  Together, these three 
provisions likely require the adoption of religious personal status law for all 
Afghanis, while Article 131 guarantees it at least for Shiites. 
In Iraq, the constitution could read as though individual Iraqis will have a 
choice whether to have their family relations governed by religious family law 
or by civil law practices.73 When reading the Iraq Constitution as a whole, 
however, it is possible to read Article 39 as requiring religious authority to 
govern this area of law.  Article 39 reads: “Iraqis are free in their commitment to 
their personal status according to their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices. This 
shall be regulated by law.” The provision protects the group rights of the 
majority Muslim population, as well as those of minority religious groups, by 
allowing them to be governed by their religious personal status law.74  At a 
minimum, it is impossible for the legislature to adopt a unified civil personal 
status law that applies to all of its citizens. 
Whether Iraqis will be able to choose to be governed by a civil personal 
status law depends on how the constitution is interpreted.75  Article 2(1)(a) of the 
 
 68. AFG. CONST. 2004. ART 3 
 69. Article 3 has the same effect as the provisions in many Muslim constitutions that explicitly 
proclaim that Islam, Shari’a or its principles are a major source of law.  NATHAN BROWN, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DEBATING ISLAM IN POST-BAATHIST IRAQ 2-3 (2005), 
available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id=16619.  Such 
a provision is unnecessary in the Afghan constitution since requiring legislation to be consistent with 
Islam effectively establishes it as a main source of law. 
 70. AFG. CONST. 2004. ART 3 
 71. INT’L LEGAL FOUND., THE CUSTOMARY LAWS OF AFGHANISTAN 4 (2004). 
 72. AFG. CONST. 2004. ART 54. 
 73. See, e.g., Nathan J. Brown, The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and 
Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2005) 6. 
 74. 97% of Iraqis are Muslim. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/iz.html. 
 75. Even if arguably Iraqis can opt out of religious personal status law, societal pressure makes 
it unlikely that many Iraqis will choose to do so, at least in the near future.  Family pressure likely 
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constitution does not permit legislation to contradict the established provisions 
of Islam.76  As with the Afghan constitution, some elements of Islam will be used 
as a measuring stick for the constitutionality of legislation.77  As to whether 
personal status laws are among those established provisions, consider that most 
Arab Muslim countries adopt some form of religious personal status law.78  
Governments are reluctant to deviate from Shari’a law in that area,79 while 
political and economic aspects of Shari’a law are regularly discarded.80 Whether 
secular family law will be treated as contradictory to established provisions of 
Islam again will depend on the views of the legislature and judiciary. 
Article 29(1)(a) of the Iraqi constitution further supports that the Iraqi 
government will impose religion within the area of personal status law as the 
provision promises to preserve the religious values of the family.81  What better 
way to ensure those values than apply religious personal status law?  Read as a 
whole, the Iraqi constitution makes it impossible for the elected legislature to 
eradicate religious personal status law and likely mandates its adoption.82 
 
will push many individuals to follow religious personal status law, while unequal power relations 
may be enough for men to force women to “choose” religious personal status law. 
 76. IR. CONST. 2005.  Article 2 also states that Islam is a fundamental source of legislation.  IR. 
CONST. 2005. ART 2(1). Describing Islam or some aspect of it as a source of law is a common 
provision throughout the Muslim world, although the exact language differs between constitutions.  
Brown, supra note 73, at 2-3.  Nathan Brown states that at its tamest, the description of Islam as a 
fundamental source of law provides moral support to legislators who wish to ground legislation in 
religious law.  Id. at 3. At the other end of the possibility spectrum, it could be read to require the 
wholesale adoption of Shari’a law into the legal system. 
 77. Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution also uses principles of democracy and the fundamental 
rights and freedoms protected in the constitution as measuring sticks.  IR. CONST. 2005. ART. 2(b) and 
(c). 
 78. Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women of 
Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 349, 368 (2004)  See also, ABOU EL FADL, ET. AL, infra.  See e.g., 
Nathan J. Brown The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (2005) 6; see also,  KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, SAID ARJOMAND, 
NATHAN BROWN, JERROLD GREEN, DONALD HOROWITZ, MICHALE RICH, BARNET RUBIN, & BIROL 
YESILDA,  DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN.8–9  (Cheryl Benard, 
Nina Hachigian eds.,) (RAND) (2003). 
 79. See, e.g., ‘Divorced from Justice: Women’s Unequal Access to Divorce in Egypt’ Human 
Rights Watch (2004)11.  While many governments are reluctant to legislate secular personal status 
law, some have successfully reformed legislation to create greater rights for women within the 
framework of religion.  See e.g., Amna Arshad, Ijtihad as a Tool for Islamic Legal Reform: Advancing 
Women’s Rights in Morocco,  16-WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129 (2006-2007). 
 80. Drumbl, supra note 78, at 368, 
 81. IR. CONST. 2005 ART. 29(1)(a), 
 82. Complicating matters, the Iraqi constitution also seems to restrict the national government 
from enacting a uniform personal status law or maintaining the current one.  Unless an area of law is 
designated as within the sole purview of the national government, regional governments are 
permitted to pass inconsistent laws that take precedence over national laws. IR. CONST. art. 117(2). 
Legislative control of personal status law has not been reserved for the national government, which 
means that political and communal leaders in each region can exercise that power freely.  Critics of 
this division of power explain: “By devolving family law to the regions, the state accommodates 
social and religious differences, while encouraging the loyalty of communal leaders to the state. 
Family law becomes part of a ‘social contract,’ trading communal autonomy for women’s rights.” 
Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, Women in Iraq: Beyond the Rhetoric MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND 
INFORMATION PROJECT 8 (2006), http://www.acttogether.org/MERIParticleSummer06.pdf . 
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The second premise of this discussion is that conservative interpretations of 
Shari’a personal status law will apply in both countries, at least for the time 
being.  Before describing these interpretations, it is important to note that Islam 
is not a monolithic religion.  There is no one set of rules of Islam, rather religious 
beliefs and Shari’a law differ by sect and by schools of thought within these 
sects. 
This discussion relies on conservative interpretations of the law because at 
this time they are the prevailing interpretations.83  While several countries that 
follow Islamic family law have amended their legislation toward more 
progressive interpretations of religious texts,84 which includes Baathist Iraq, the 
political tides in Iraq and Afghanistan favor classical interpretations.  Research 
in Afghanistan shows that the judiciary applies classical interpretations of 
personal status law.85  The Max Planck Institute concluded that despite a 
personal status statute that combines mostly the Hanafi school of Sunni thought 
with improvements taken from other schools: “In practice, the judges . . . bypass 
statutory law and apply their interpretation of the hanafi rules, as far as they 
know them, thus putting aside all improvements that had been incorporated 
into the code as compared to the classical hanafi rules.”86 
As for Iraq, current personal status legislation is relatively progressive. It 
restricts polygamy, punishes coercing women to marry and revokes men’s right 
to unilaterally and extra-judicially divorce their wives, among other breaks from 
classical religious law.87  Women’s rights advocates fear, however, that Iraq will 
replace the current code with stricter religious rules, undoing these departures 
 
 83. See, e.g., Susan Otterman, Islam: Governing under Sharia, Council on Foreign Relations (2005), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8034/ (“Most Middle Eastern countries continue to incorporate 
some traditional sharia into their legal codes, especially in the area of personal-status law, which 
governs marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In other areas of the law, such as the criminal code, most 
Islamic nations have attempted to limit the application of traditional sharia, replacing it either with 
secular legislation or with laws characterized as modern interpretations of sharia.”). 
 84. For example, Tunisia eliminated a man’s right to unilaterally declare a divorce extra-
judicially as well as his right to participate in a polygynous marriage, justifying both changes on 
religious prescriptions.  Michele Brandt and Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension between Women’s Rights 
and Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIG. 105, 129 
(1995-1996).  Morocco also limited the right to polygyny using progressive interpretations of 
religious law.  Morocco Personal Status Law (2004) Preamble and Art. 40 (English Translation by 
Global Rights, at http://www.hrea.org/moudawana.html (last visited September 3, 2006)). 
 85. The judiciary’s conservatism likely will remain unchallenged.  As Deniz Kandiyoti 
describes, proponents of centralizing Afghanistan’s government rely heavily on Islamic identity and 
law as a unifying force to overcome communal loyalties.  Deniz Kandiyoti, Occasional Paper 4: The 
Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan, 2005 UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INST. FOR SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 12, available at http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/462fc27bd 
1fce00880256b4a0060d2af/3050be40da5b871cc125704400534a7a/$FILE/OPGP4.pdf.  Conservative 
notions of what it means to be Muslim become the identity behind which the divided tribal 
communities can unify.  Id. 
 86. Family Structures and Family Law in Afghanistan, 2005 THE MAX PLANCK INST. FOR FOREIGN 
PRIVATE LAW AND FOREIGN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 8, http://www.mpiprivhh.mpg.de/ 
deutsch/Forschung/LaufendeProjekte/Afghanistan/MPI-Report_Family.pdf. 
 87. Noga Efrati, Negotiating Rights in Iraq: Women and the Personal Status Law, 59(4) THE MIDDLE 
EAST JOURNAL 577 (2005). 
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from traditional practices.88  The Iraqi Governing Council, which served as an 
advisory board to the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), attempted 
to do just that shortly after the fall of the Hussein regime.89  L. Paul Bremer, the 
head of the CPA at the time, refused to ratify the change.90 
The US is no longer in the position to protect personal status law, which 
remains vulnerable as Islamists increase their power in Iraq.  As early as 
December 2003, the United States Institute for Peace identified that “Iraq seems 
to be experiencing a religious revival and religious leaders, particularly Shiite 
leaders, exert increasing political influence.”91  In the December 2005 election, the 
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) won a plurality just short of a majority of seats in the 
National Assembly. 92 The UIA is a Shi’a political party umbrella group 
dominated by two conservative Islamist groups, the Supreme Council of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and al-Da’wa.  It was under the leadership of 
a member of SCIRI that the Iraqi Governing Council attempted to revoke the 
progressive personal status law.  The al-Dawa party promised in its campaign 
that it “would guarantee the family’s status based on Islamic values and the 
traditional norms of Iraqi society.”93 The UIA’s political leaders appear to be 
focused on increasing the role of religion in Iraq’s government, although they 
are not unified on what that entails.94  Kurds, who hold the next largest block in 
the National Assembly, tend to be more secular, but Islamist ideology is gaining 
within the Kurdish population.95 
The third premise of this discussion is that women’s advocates will not 
succeed in challenging these conservative interpretations as a violation of the 
constitution, at least in the near future.  The issue boils down to how the 
judiciaries will treat apparent conflicts between religious laws and human rights 
protections.  The Afghan constitution does not contain a clause stating how to 
handle such conflicts.96  Iraq’s constitution permits rights to be limited as long as 
the “limitation or restriction does not violate the essence of the right or 
freedom.”97  Stripping rights down to their essence could allow for excessive 
limitations of human rights.  An appropriate standard for determining when 
 
 88. See, e.g., Dahr Jamail and Ali Al-Fadhily, Iraq: It’s Hard Being a Woman, INTER PRESS NEWS 
SERVICE AGENCY, Dec. 5 2006, http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=35718 ; Graham Usher,  Mother 
Iraq AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ONLINE ISSUE NO. 679, 26 February - 3 March 2004, http://weekly.ahram. 
org.eg/2004/679/re9.htm. 
 89. Al-Ali and Pratt, supra note 82, at 3. The CPA attempted to pass legislation that would 
revoke the current personal status law and transfer jurisdiction over personal status matters to 
religious leaders.  David Shelby U.S.-Iraq Women’s Network Prepares for Iraqi Elections (2004) 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=April&x=2004042 
6174230ndyblehs0.6389734 
 90. Id. 
 91. David Smock, The Role of Religion in Iraqi Politics, USIPEACE BRIEFING, Dec. 23, 2003, 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2003/1223_NBiraq.html. 
 92. Phebe Marr, Special Report 160: Who Are Iraq’s Leaders? What Do They Want?, 2006 UNITED 
STATES INST. OF PEACE 12, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr160.pdf. 
 93. BROWN, supra note 73, at 6. 
 94. Marr, supra note 92, at 15. 
 95. Id. at 14. 
 96. See AFG. CONST. 2004. 
 97. IR. CONST. 2005  ART. 44. 
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constitutional rights can be limited should account for the importance of the 
right, the reasons for the restriction, and whether the limitation is justifiable in a 
democratic, human rights-based country.98  This clause is a problem for all Iraqi 
citizens, but could prove to be particularly problematic for sharply contested 
women’s rights. 
On its own, the fact that religious personal status law is protected expressly 
in both the Iraqi and Afghan constitutions could be viewed as insulating this 
area of law from judicial review.99 Separate protection for personal status law 
without a clear statement that the religious law must conform to the 
constitutions’ human rights provisions could place it in a protective bubble 
removed from accountability.  To the extent the courts exercise judicial review, 
they could resolve apparent conflicts by: (1) favoring human rights over 
religion, (2) favoring religion over human rights, or (3) finding a way to read the 
provisions as consistent with each other. The requirement that courts use 
aspects of Islam as a measuring stick for the constitutionality of legislation in 
both countries suggests that religious law will be presumed to be constitutional.  
This means the judiciaries would be forced to prefer religion over human rights 
or find a way to read them as consistent. This conclusion is bolstered by the 
persistent references to Islam in both constitutions, which shows the intention to 
permit a role for religion in governance. The Iraqi constitution also requires 
legislation to conform to fundamental human rights and principles of 
democracy.100 Placing these requirements in the same article as the religious 
repugnancy clause suggests that the constitution’s drafters believe that no 
conflict exists between religious laws and constitutionally protected individual 
rights.101  The probable assumption that religious law is constitutional could 
result in removing personal status law from judicial oversight and 
accountability. 
 
 98. An example of such a clause can be found in South Africa’s constitution.  Article 36, reads: 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including 
a. the nature of the right; 
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c. the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 S. AFR. CONST. 1996. 
 99. Ayelet Shachar, Reshaping the Multicultural Model: Group Accommodation and Individual Rights, 
8 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOCIAL ISSUES 83, at 95–99 (1998)(describing how state policy that permits 
multiculturalism may follow the notion of “family privacy”,  which could insulate group practices 
from governmental intervention even when they violate the rights of group members). 
 100. ART. 2 (B) and (C). 
 101. Id. at.2. 
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B. The Transformation 
Keeping in mind the three premises from the previous section, particularly 
that there will be no governmental oversight of personal status law, the 
remainder of Part II describes classical interpretations of important aspects of 
personal status law and how they create relational rights. At times, this section 
measures religious rules against international human rights law because the 
paper is intended to influence Western policy-makers who espouse the 
importance of promoting international human rights protections around the 
world.102 Once some, if not many, of women’s individual rights are revealed as 
relational rights or under threat of becoming so, the potential depth of the injury 
is revealed – which is that Iraq and Afghanistan’s constitutional protection for 
religious law may remove women from under the safeguards of the 
constitutions’ human rights provisions. 
Starting with marriage, men and women with full legal capacity have the 
right to refuse to marry.103 Under most classical interpretations, a woman cannot 
marry without her male guardian’s permission.104  A guardian can refuse 
permission on the basis of a perceived social inequality between the spouses.105 
Inequality could refer to differences in lineage, amount of property or piety, 
among other things.106  No Muslim woman is permitted to marry a non-Muslim 
man, although Muslim men may take wives that practice a monotheistic 
religion.107  One explanation for the limitations on women’s choice of spouses is 
that women need to be protected from making “immature” or “overzealous” 
decisions.108  Under most schools of thought, only the guardian can contract a 
marriage. 109  The Hanafi school is the exception as it merely requires his 
participation.110 
These rules of marriage, to the extent they are protected by a constitution 
and the judiciary, not only treat women as incompetent to make a monumental 
decision but transform several individual rights into relational rights.  Giving 
guardians the right to refuse a woman’s marriage gives them the power to 
 
 102. See, e.g., President Proclaims Human Rights Day & Bill of Rights Week, Office of the Press 
Secretary (2001) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/print/20011209.html (describing 
the importance of “defending international human rights.”; European Union Guidelines on Human Rights 
Dialogues (2001)4; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ 14469EN_HR.pdf (describing 
the European Union’s policy of promoting international human rights law around the world.) 
 103. JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER MODERN ISLAMIC 
LEGISLATION 7 (2nd Ed. 1994).  It appears that guardians may have the right to compel minors to 
marry.  Id. at 10, 12; HAMMUDAH ‘ABD AL ‘ALI, THE FAMILY STRUCTURE IN ISLAM 80 (1977) (describing 
that a guardian may force a marriage when he fears the woman “will engage in sexual misbehavior” 
or is a minor.). 
 104. But see NASIR, supra note 103, at 10 (describing that guardianship could be viewed more as 
agency where the woman in deference to tradition gives her guardian permission to conduct the 
marriage). 
 105. Id. at 18.  The Hanafi school of Sunni thought may be an exception to this general rule.  
ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, SHARI’AH THE ISLAMIC LAW 142 (1984). 
 106. NASIR, supra note 103, at 18—19. 
 107. Id. at 29.  Men are not permitted to marry women who are not Christian or Jewish.  Id. at 45. 
 108. DOI, supra note 105, at 123. 
 109. NASIR, supra note 103, at 10. 
 110. Id. 
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determine whether women can exercise their equality and autonomy rights, 
both of which are constitutionally protected in Afghanistan and Iraq.111  True 
equality requires that women be given the same right as men to choose with 
whom to enter into marriage.112  Choosing a spouse also is an exercise of an 
adult’s autonomous decision-making power113  A guardian who defers to the 
woman’s wishes allows her access to those rights; a guardian who does not, 
denies them.  Men, on the other hand, retain their individual rights to autonomy 
and equality under these rules, although their marriage rights also are restricted. 
The restriction that men may marry only women who follow a monotheistic 
faith is applied equally to all men; no person has the discretion to refuse them 
the right to marry.  Overall, the practice of requiring a guardian to approve 
women’s marriages wholly denies them the right to equality under the law, 
gives their guardians control over women’s access to equality and autonomy 
rights, and stereotypes women, all of which maintain patriarchy and 
discrimination. 
Within marriage, Shari’a law creates a system of complementary rights and 
duties, where men and women receive different rights and owe each other 
different duties based on their familial and social roles.  The differing rights are 
based on the concept that God gave men and women complementary qualities 
that create harmony in the family and community and that ultimately their 
rights and duties, while separate, are equal: 
God has endowed men and women with different qualities to perform their 
different tasks. A woman must bear children, for which God has given her the 
quality of compassion. . . God has endowed man with more than women (twice 
the inheritance, imama and qada’), making him responsible for her. This is not 
an honor but a burden involving responsibilities and duties.114 
Under this system, a man has a duty to maintain his wife financially,115 including 
providing her with a home.116  The duty of maintenance of a husband is an 
enforceable right of the wife.  In return, the woman owes her husband a duty of 
 
 111. IR. CONST. 2005 ART. 14—15 ; AFG. CONST. 2004 ART. 22, 24. 
 112. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which establishes 
international standards for women’s rights, attempts to address these types of rights violations.  
Article 16 requires governments to provide women with the right to choose whether to marry and to 
whom.  Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)  ART. 16, Dec. 
18, 1979. 
 113. McClain, supra note 38, at 217—218 (quoting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court , which refers 
to “the right to choose one’s marriage partner . . . [as] a fundamental right protected by the right of 
privacy.”). See also, Edith M. Hofmeister, Women Need Not Apply: Discrimination and the Supreme 
Court’s Intimate Association Test, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1994). 
 114. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Islam and Gender: Dilemmas in the Changing Arab World” 14 
in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito (Eds.) ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1998; 
but see Lisa Hajjar, Religion, State Power, and Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies: A Framework for 
Comparative Analysis, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 7 (2004). 
 115. NASIR, supra note 103, at 63.( Maintenance includes provision of food, clothing, medicine, 
and medical services).  ‘ABD AL ‘ALI supra note 103, at 149. 
 116. NASIR, supra note 103, at 41.  Although classical Shari’a law allows for polygyny, men are 
required to provide a home for each wife without additional wives or family members living there.  
Id. 
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obedience, which is a husband’s enforceable right.117  Obedience typically means 
that the woman must not leave her home without the permission of her 
husband118 and that she must provide children and sexual relations.119  
Disobedience, whether by leaving the home without permission, denying her 
husband sexual relations or refusing to have children, results in a loss of the 
woman’s right to maintenance.120  It also may allow a man to “discipline” his 
wife.121  Both spouses owe each other a duty of respect.122 
The system of complementary rights based on a woman’s obligation of 
obedience violates the guarantee of equality under the law since by definition 
complementary rights treat men and women differently.  This system also 
transforms a wide variety of women’s individual rights into relational rights.  
First, access to their equality rights depends on whether the husbands choose to 
enforce obedience rules.  Husbands who allow their wives to work, travel and 
make reproductive and sexual choices freely, allow women access to their 
equality rights.  Any restriction on those decisions denies women their equality. 
Obedience rules that require women to exchange sexual relations for 
maintenance also deprive women of their rights to bodily integrity and to 
autonomy, establishing them as relational rights since it sets up a situation 
where the woman’s body belongs to her husband. Under international human 
rights law, the rights to autonomy and bodily integrity permit all people, 
including women, to choose whether and when to have sexual relations.123  They 
also permit women to choose whether and when to have children.124  Iraq’s 
constitution guarantees autonomy and bodily integrity rights in Article 15,125 
while Afghanistan protects the right to autonomy in Article 24.126 Women 
subjected to classical interpretations of religious law can exercise these rights 
only to the extent their husbands permit them.  These rights remain individual 
rights for men, as women do not hold the reciprocal power to require sexual 
relations or children. 
Similarly, women’s right to freedom of movement is relational under a 
system of obedience.  Freedom of movement is protected expressly in both the 
Iraqi and Afghan constitutions.  Afghanistan’s constitution promises that 
 
 117. ‘ABD AL ‘ALI, supra note 103, at 148 read together with 172. 
 118. NASIR, supra note 103, at 41–42; ‘ABD AL ‘ALI, supra note 103, at 172–73. 
 119. NASIR, supra note 103, at 64–65; DOI, supra note 105, at 205. 
 120. NASIR, supra note 103, at 66–68. According to one scholar a woman loses her right to 
maintenance if she expresses an “aversion to her husband, hatred toward him, disinterest in his 
companionship or attraction to another person.”  ‘ABD AL ‘ALI, supra note 103, at 138. 
 121. Id. at 173. 
 122. NASIR, supra note 103, at 43. 
 123. Yakaré-Oulé Jansen, The Right to Freely have Sex?  Beyond Biology: Reproductive Rights and 
Sexual Sefl-Determination, 40 AKRON L. REV. 311, 317–20 (2007) (discussing right to be free from sexual 
violence and coercion). 
 124. CEDAW, supra note 112 ART. 16(1) &16(1)(e) (“States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: The same rights to 
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights.”). 
 125. IR. CONST. 2005. 
 126. AFG. CONST. 2004. 
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“[e]very Afghan shall have the right to travel and settle in any part of the 
country, except in areas forbidden by law;” and that “[e]very Afghan shall have 
the right to travel outside Afghanistan and return, according to the provisions of 
the law.”127  In Article 24, Iraq’s constitution guarantees the “right of free 
movement, travel, and residence inside and outside Iraq.”128 Despite these 
constitutional provisions, classical interpretations of religious rules prohibit 
women from leaving their home or traveling without their husbands’ 
permission, with few exceptions, establishing a relational right to freedom of 
movement.129 Men, however, maintain this constitutionally protected, individual 
right as women have no right to restrict their movement. 
Obedience rules also transform the individual right to work into a 
relational right that requires a man’s permission.  Both constitutions protect this 
right,130 yet husbands could prohibit their wives from working or restrict them 
from working in certain professions or jobs.  The relational nature of the right to 
work could cause severe harm since it ensures women’s dependency on men 
unless women are independently wealthy.  While religious rules require men to 
meet women’s basic needs, financial control gives men an unfair power 
advantage in the relationship by giving them the power to require women to 
bargain for access to resources beyond what the law requires.  Men also may be 
harmed by complementary rights as women do not owe their husbands a 
reciprocal duty of maintenance regardless of their financial circumstances.131 
Classical Shari’a law’s treatment of marital property also transforms 
women’s constitutional right to own private property into a relational right.132  
The religious law views property owned by a married couple as separate 
property belonging to the husband or the wife, rather than joint property.  
Women are entitled to control over and to retain their full rights in property 
they brought into the marriage, received through inheritance, purchased with 
their separate income or money, and received as dower, except in cases of a Khul 
divorce as described below.133  All other property belongs to the husband.  A 
woman’s unpaid labor in the home makes no impact on this distribution of 
property nor does her decision to contribute her money or property to the 
family, depriving her of her full individual right to own private property. What 
would be deemed joint marital property under many secular laws, is treated 
 
 127. Id. at. ART. 39. 
 128. IR. CONST. 2005 ART. 24 
 129. Women cannot be prevented from attending religious worship or from visiting their 
families when a parent is ill.  NASIR, supra note 103, at 41–42. 
 130. IR. CONST. 2005 ART. 22(1); AFG. CONST. 2004 ART. 48. 
 131. NASIR, supra note, 103.(defining maintenance as “the lawful right of the wife under a valid 
marriage contract on certain conditions.”)(emphasis added) See also, LYNN WELCHMAN, ISLAMIC 
FAMILY LAW TEXT AND PRACTICE IN PALESTINE(1999)(“The reason why the woman’s work under the 
classical rules is not held to be a legitimate reason to leave the house is that the husband alone is 
responsible for his wife’s maintenance; in theory, she has no legal obligation to spend anything on 
herself or the house, since  everything she actually needs is supposed to be provided by the 
husband.”) 
 132. AFG. CONST. 2004  ART. 40 (protecting right to own private property); IR. CONST. 2005 ART. 23 
(protecting right to own private property) 
 133. See, e.g., ISLAM, LAND AND PROPERTY RESEARCH SERIES UN HABITAT, PAPER 5: MUSLIM 
WOMEN AND PROPERTY § 5.2.3 (2005). 
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under religious law as belonging solely to the man.  Women’s property rights 
again are relational as they can access them only if their husbands choose to 
share this property or on divorce relinquish it.  Men, on the other hand, retain 
their individual right to own private property, including the right to sell the 
property, regardless of their status as married. 
If a married couple is unhappy, under all interpretations of Shari’a law the 
couple is allowed to divorce; religious law “does not keep them tied in a 
loathsome chain to a painful and agonizing position.”134  Classical interpretations 
give the husband the unilateral and extra-judicial right to declare a divorce.135  
Women receive divorces by agreement with their husbands, which is a  
Khul divorce, or in some countries by court order.  Unlike men, women can 
receive a divorce only with someone else’s permission.  Court-ordered divorces 
typically are hard to obtain and being a victim of domestic violence does not 
always lead the court to grant a woman a divorce.136 Grounds for judicial divorce 
differ both between and within Sunni and Shi’a sects.137  They may be limited to 
proof of the husband’s impotence or insanity138 or expanded to include when 
there is injury or discord,139 a failure to pay maintenance,140 and abandonment by 
the husband. 141 
In a Khul divorce, women relinquish all financial entitlements they receive 
or should receive from their husbands in exchange for their agreement for a 
divorce;142 this is considered compensation to the husband according to religious 
thought.143 Upon marriage, the husband pays a dower to his wife that belongs 
solely to her.  The dower is considered a right of a married woman;144 it is a gift 
that belongs to her and is considered a sign of respect.145  In many countries and 
permissible under religious law, the practice is for the man and woman to agree 
to a specific amount of dower but for the husband to pay only a small portion 
initially.146  If the couple should divorce or on the death of the husband, the 
remaining dower becomes payable to the wife; it is a debt he is obligated legally 
to pay to her.  With a Khul divorce, women relinquish their entitlement to that 
 
 134. DOI, supra note 105, at 169. 
 135. NASIR, supra note 103, at 74–75. 
 136. See, e.g., Hajjar, supra note 114, at 25; IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, 
NIGERIA: AVAILABILITY OF DIVORCE FOR WOMEN IN A MUSLIM MARRIAGE WHO HAVE EXPERIENCE 
DOMESTIC ABUSE April 9, 2001. 
 137. NASIR, supra note 103, at 88. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 97. 
 141. Id. at 100. 
 142. Id. at 84.  Women typically are entitled to maintenance for a short period of time, usually for 
3 months after the declaration of a divorce, during which time if the divorce was declared 
unilaterally by the husband, the husband can rethink his decision.  Id. at 107; See also DOI, supra note 
105, at 200.  If a court finds that the husband’s unilateral divorce was arbitrary, then it may award a 
woman additional maintenance. NASIR, supra note 103, at 105. 
 143. Id. at 84–85. 
 144. Id. at 52. 
 145. DOI, supra note 105, at 158–59 (“The payment . . . on the part of the husband is an admission 
of the independence of the wife, for she becomes the owner of the property on her marriage.”). 
 146. NASIR, supra note 103, at 49. 
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debt as well as to maintenance.147  A husband also may require a woman to give 
up maintenance payments for their children or even her custody rights in 
exchange for his consent to the divorce.148 
Overall, the right to divorce under classical religious law violates the 
requirement of equal treatment under the law.  Men can extricate themselves 
from the marriage with relative freedom whereas women require someone else’s 
permission.  It implies that only men are capable of determining for themselves 
that they cannot reconcile with their spouses whereas women need the 
validation of either their husbands or a court. 
When women cannot prove one of the grounds for a court-ordered divorce 
or if this option is unavailable, they must bargain for a divorce with their 
husbands. The process of achieving a Khul divorce makes women’s rights to 
equality and autonomy relational since access to these rights depends on 
whether their husbands grant them permission. Women can have the same right 
to an extra-judicial no-fault divorce and can exercise their decision-making 
power only if their husbands permit it.  Additionally, women’s right to own 
private property becomes relational.  While a dower is treated as a gift to the 
woman, and therefore as her property, women who utilize the Khul divorce 
have only a relational right to that property – their right exists as long as their 
husbands give it to them.  Furthermore, women have relational rights to marital 
property since husbands, considered the owners, can choose whether to share it 
on divorce.  Putting these divorce rules and relational rights in broader 
perspective, husbands have the power to prohibit their wives from working and 
on divorce may be able to force the women to relinquish any financial 
entitlements and all marital property, potentially leaving them destitute. 
Custody of children on divorce is granted to the woman while a child is 
young, as it is believed the woman is the appropriate person to look after 
children in their early years.149  After the child reaches a specified age, custody 
belongs to the father.150  Some sects or schools restrict women’s custody of boys 
to when breast-feeding stops and slightly older for girls; others allow custody of 
both until puberty.151 
There are numerous restrictions on women’s rights to custodianship under 
classical interpretations of Shari’a law.  Women cannot act as custodians if they 
remarry to men not in a close familial relationship to the children.152 The mother 
and children cannot move far from the father or travel without the father’s 
permission. 153  Other restrictions that different sects or schools impose are that 
the woman and children must live in an approved residence and must retain 
their Muslim identity.154 Men have no restrictions on becoming custodians of 
 
 147. Id. at 84. 
 148. Id. at 85. 
 149. NASIR, supra note 103, at 131. 
 150. Id. at 144. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 136. 
 153. Id. at 141. 
 154. Id. at 137. 
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their children. 155 Further, men are always treated as the legal guardians of their 
children with an inherent right to make decisions regarding their children, 
particularly in the area of education.156  Men are obligated to pay maintenance 
for their children unless the women relinquish their entitlement in order to 
reach a divorce agreement.  A court may order the husband to pay maintenance 
despite the agreement, but it becomes a debt the woman owes the man.157 
The custody regime deprives men and women of equality under the law, as 
the decision over custody is based solely on gender.  The rules are detrimental to 
all members of the family since both parents are deprived arbitrarily of 
important parental rights, while custody decisions are based on formulaic 
assumptions of what is in the best interest of the children rather than an 
examination of what is in fact in their best interests. These custody rules also 
transform women’s individual rights to freedom of movement, autonomy and to 
choose their religion into relational rights.  Women cannot freely choose their 
religion, whom to marry, where live, or whether to travel without risking 
custody of their children.  These decisions must undergo the approval of their 
ex-husbands, which transforms these rights into relational rights.  Each of the 
effected rights remains individual for men as these restrictions on custody rights 
apply only to women. 
From this limited examination of classical interpretations of Shari’a 
personal status law, it becomes apparent that the problem women confront from 
constitutional protection of this religious law in Iraq and Afghanistan is not 
simply discrimination but also that they may be removed from under the 
protections of many constitutional rights.158  The concept of equality under the 
law does not exist in the area of personal status law, while women’s access to 
their rights to equality, freedom of movement, bodily integrity, property and 
autonomy likely will depend on the will of their fathers and/or husbands.  
Women likely will be deprived of their individual rights by a constitution that 
gives religious or cultural personal status law a role in governance without 
ensuring that any private actor to whom jurisdiction over law and/or law 
enforcement is transferred is held accountable to the constitution.  All of this 
information refutes the assumption that the balance between the role of religion 
in governance and the human rights provisions in the Iraqi and Afghan 
constitutions ensures that women’s rights will be protected.  Once the 
assumption is proved untrue, there is no basis for Western policy-makers’ 
support for these constitutions or any other constitutions that protect religious 
or cultural law without ensuring that rights remain individual rather than 
transformed into relational rights. 
 
 155. Id. at 138. 
 156. Id. at 131. 
 157. Id. at 86. 
 158. Women may be able to mitigate the harm of obedience rules by stipulating in their marriage 
contracts that they must have the right to work, to travel and to divorce without restriction. See, e.g., 
Lynn Welchman, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW TEXT AND PRACTICE IN PALESTINE, Women’s Center for Legal 
Aid and Counseling, 65 (1999).  Such mitigation, however, does not undo the transformation of these 
rights to relational rights since the husbands must agree to these contractual stipulations, which 
means they remain under men’s control. 
05__LUDSIN.DOC 5/27/2008  2:07:38 PM 
 RELATIONAL RIGHTS MASQUERADING AS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 221 
CONCLUSION 
The expanded theory of relational rights begins to capture the depth of the 
risk of injury to women’s rights when constitutions provide religion or culture a 
role in governance without guaranteeing that the application of religious or 
cultural law will be subjected to scrutiny for human rights violations.  Relational 
rights are created from individual rights when unaccountable, private actors are 
given the power to determine the content of those rights for persons with whom 
they have a relationship.  Religious or cultural law accomplishes this 
transformation when it protects and enforces unequal power relations, whether 
in society or in the family.  Once rights become relational, weaker parties may 
not be able to access some or all of the protections of the constitution, at least in 
the affected areas of law.  Instead, they must hope the stronger parties allow 
them to exercise their rights.  Because most cultural and religious law maintains 
elements of patriarchy, women suffer the greatest risk of having their individual 
rights undergo the transformation. 
A democratic constitution and protections for progressive human rights 
will not necessarily neutralize women’s risk.  Suad Joseph’s description of how 
she conceived of relational rights depended on a political system that was weak, 
corrupt, undemocratic and ultimately failing; it was based on a government that 
refused to provide its constituency the benefits, privileges and rights considered 
in democratic theory to inhere in all citizens without the intervention of private 
actors. Relational rights created by constitutions, on the other hand, can exist 
even if the government is democratic and follows the rule of law as long as the 
constitution protects these unequal power relations by protecting the law that 
maintains them. 
The constitutional protection of equality rights may not alter the risk of 
harm to women, since the danger goes well beyond discrimination.  To frame 
the danger of adopting religious or cultural law into the legal system as 
potentially resulting in discrimination against women suggests that the power 
to correct the problem lies in the hands of the government; it assumes a violation 
of equality provisions of the law and/or constitution can be corrected through 
state accountability and the application of the rule of law. What the expanded 
theory of relational rights shows is that the power to correct discrimination in 
fact is controlled by private actors who often are under no mandate or 
constitutional requirement to protect women’s rights. 
To combat relational rights, these constitutions must ensure the 
enforcement of human rights guarantees against private actors.  The failure to 
do so should force Western policy-makers to rethink their support for 
constitutional protection of religious or cultural law. While it is too late for the 
concept of relational rights to influence the Afghan and Iraqi constitutions, the 
trend of constitutionally protecting religious or cultural law must be re-
examined in light of the new harm identified. 
